



# Spaces of violence: A typology of the political geography of violence against migrants seeking asylum in the EU

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## ABSTRACT

This paper, based on research conducted with asylum seekers in three European Union (EU) member-states, examines the connections among various forms of violence against forced migrants in different state settings. Because violence that is produced within states is not uniform and often transcends borders, understanding how it varies across different geographical settings illustrates the complexity of the risks that migrants face. This paper presents a typology that examines interconnections between the production of various forms of violence and the complex spaces that constitute irregular migration into the EU to better understand these multifaceted factors and why we can anticipate certain forms of violence in a particular space. It also fosters future avenues of research as it provides a foundation for greater collaboration and advocacy to expose and rectify hierarchical imbalances of power and actors responsible for such violence.

## 1. Introduction

When war came, I saw my brother killed and mother raped. I paid smugglers to travel to Europe. They beat me and screamed at me. They locked me in a shed with many people for days with little food and water. They threatened to call the border guards if we made noise. It was very hot inside, an old man died in there-he didn't move. At the Turkish border people shot at us ... Now, I wait, alone, in this Danish camp. I have been waiting for asylum papers for many months, without work. I fear my papers will be rejected and I will be deported. I am very afraid (interview #46, 2017).

Since 2015, when more than one million migrants arrived in Europe fleeing violent civil wars, armed conflict, persecution and poverty, border security has been catapulted to the top of the European Union (EU) and its member-states' strategic agendas. As the situations and violence that many face in their source states are so dire, their hope for asylum in Europe fuels them to leave. As the quotation above reveals, migrants face pervasive violence at home, throughout their journeys (in transitional state[s]), and in host states, as various forms of violence transcend borders and are generated in response or anticipation of migrant mobilities. Violence is not a monolithic concept; variations across different geographical settings illustrate the complexity of the risks that migrants face. A typology of different forms of violence (physical, verbal, psychological, sexual, and non-linear) and their interconnections across geographical settings is proposed to serve as a research and theory-building guide germane to anticipating certain

forms of violence in particular spaces.

While violence is present in source states with high levels of forced migration, irregular migrants face an array of violence, imprisonment, and death during their long and arduous journeys to and within Europe (e.g., [McConnell et al., 2017](#)). Efforts by EU states' for "securitization of migration" ([Huysmans, 2006](#)) and the militarization of external border controls have intensified over time. Policy responses emphasizing a renewed commitment to tougher border security as a deterrent against irregular migration to Europe produce and foster violence against migrants both in transit and in EU asylum camps.

The various forms of violence that migrants experience impart state responsibility. Nevins argues that many national or supranational entities believe that state power justifies national sovereignty in which "the associated regime of territorial policing and exclusion are paramount and demonstrate the hegemonic nature of nation-statist logic particularly through territorial expressions" (2017, 1350). In this way, states generate spatial regimes that injure or kill individuals seeking asylum by "asserting migrant exclusion in the name of the nation-state and accompanying policing apparatus are fine" (2017, 1353). As state strategies to control migration increasingly transcend sovereign borders (e.g., [Jones, 2016](#)), these intensified practices also reveal the inequitable power between states and irregular migrants (e.g., [Mountz & Hiemstra, 2014](#)). Bordering processes, exclusionary securitization of migration, and asylum policies create spaces in which violence against migrants is provoked, committed, condoned, or protracted. [Jones \(2016\)](#) argues this is a result of efforts by the privileged few, who may benefit from

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globalization, often employing narratives about terrorism and smuggling as rationale for increased policing of international borders.

This paper is based on research conducted with asylum seekers in the EU that demonstrated participants universally experienced violence in various forms in their source, transitional and/or host states. Drawing from ethnographic interviews in several asylum camps in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden in 2016–2017, this paper investigates the forms of violence (physical, verbal, psychological, sexual, and non-linear) migrants experience and the spaces (source, transit/transitional, and EU host state) they travel through, occupy, create, and modify with their presence – anticipated or realized. These categories encompass an array of jurisdictions, state and non-state actors, and geopolitical narratives that yield various intersecting forms of violence against migrants. Since a kaleidoscopic investigation is too multifarious for a comprehensive analysis, we need an analytical tool that provides a theoretical foundation for how and why we should expect certain forms of violence in these spaces. A typology, derived from interviews, of the various geographies of violence that migrants experience allows us to move from the kaleidoscopic to the focused, with a conceptual framework for geographic analysis and theory-building.

The following discussion is organized in four main sections. The first builds upon current theoretical discussions of violence and migration policies. The second section explains the methods for data collection and analysis. Drawing from interview data, the third presents a topological examination of categorical forms of violence committed against migrants in different locations. The final section reflects on the typology and its implications for future research.

## 2. State violence and migration

Contemporary laws regulating international migration are predicated on the existence of sovereign states and their right to control their territory (e.g., [McConnell et al., 2017](#)). Max Weber argued that the modern state is formed from a territorial system that controls its territory by establishing a monopoly of violence within its borders. To [Weber \(1918\)](#), states claim sole legitimate authority to employ physical force or violence (e.g., military or police) within a given territory in order to protect and manage its society.

Based on these assumptions of statecraft and control, transnational irregular migration is increasingly framed as an action that challenges or violates states' ability to control both society and territorial borders. States and state spaces have transformed over time, driven by specific contexts and actualized through an assemblage of political and social practices, legislation, and narratives, as well as material and symbolic systems of governance e.g., ([Painter, 2006](#)). The resulting "structuration of power relations" crosses scales of political space through and beyond state borders ([Moisio and Paasi, 2013](#)). [Ne vins \(2017\)](#) argues that migrant movement challenges states' authority to police their borders and the bodies within their territory through political classifications (e.g., citizens, foreigner, etc.). State efforts to augment territorial control are at a historic high, generating violence and death for many migrants.

By focusing on the connections that exist between state and society that are manifested through selective citizenship and nationalistic narratives, scholars expose conditions in which the state is inserted into everyday life and, significantly, on individual bodies (e.g., [Maillet, Mountz, & Williams, 2016](#); [Ne vins, 2010](#)). Indeed, conceptualizing states as agents that mobilize their sovereign reach via various geopolitical practices reveals how states enact physical violence within and beyond their boundaries. This often manifests in power modalities that generate myriad forms of violence against irregular migrants. While violence may occur in one place, the trauma of that experience is not bound to that place and time, but travels with victims, producing a stream of violence across space. Thus, in its efforts to control migrant mobilities, the state is both a form and agent of violence.

Violence can be defined as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a

group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation" ([WHO, 2002](#), p. 172). Recent work has investigated how states increasingly are responding to globalization and perceived threats related to migration through exclusionary practices of bordering and deterrence (e.g., [Jones, 2016](#); [Mountz & Hiemstra, 2014](#)). State space may be conceptualized as a networked and multi-scalar social and political process that dynamically stretches throughout and beyond state borders. Scholars have also noted the increasing reach or "externalization" of borders beyond a single demarcated line to multi-dimensional entities or "borderscapes" (e.g. [Brambilla, 2014](#); [Dell'Agnes e & Amilhat-Szary, 2015](#); [Paasi, 2006](#)) that delimit the sovereign state.

Investigations of dynamic bordering processes, including (de/re-) bordering, conceptualize borders as non-static and multi-sited entities (e.g., [Ne vins, 2010](#); [Squire, 2011](#); [Vaughan-Williams, 2015](#)). In this vein, [Amilhat-Szary and Giraut \(2015\)](#) argue that diverse, complex, and mobile "borderities" are experienced differently and can function detached from a fixed territorial state. [Mountz](#) demonstrates that the territorial nature of border enforcement against irregular migrants is increasingly "delocalized," magnified and "thickened" by enforcement at the source of perceived threats and offshore interception of migrants, including on territorial peripheries and islands ([Mountz, 2010, 2017](#); or e.g.,; [Triandafyllidou, 2014](#)) or other "off-shoring" border work (e.g., [Bialasiewicz, 2015](#)).

[Huysmans \(2006\)](#) argues that "securitization of migration" occurs through power and key government techniques underpinning legislation and execution of migration policy, fuels inflated narratives of threats migrants pose, and frames migration as a security concern evoked by the "War on Terror" ([Hyndman, 2012](#)). As irregular migration evolved to be perceived as a security threat, securitizing migration has become the point of convergence for migration and asylum legislation. This resulted in increased border protection and policing (e.g., [McConnell et al., 2017](#)), transnational regulatory power, and "border militarization as a spatial re-articulation of sovereign power" ([Jones & Johnson, 2016](#), p. 188) in an effort to stop unwanted migration into Europe.

[Ne vins \(2010\)](#) also highlights how states produce violence through borders, utilizing citizenship to determine whether an individual deserves human rights. Through racist branding and ideological hardening, states and their border policing form what he terms the "Gatekeeper State." The state defines individuals as "alien," thereby designating them as the criminal "Other," creating difference that fosters and foments an anti-immigrant sentiment among the public. Such exclusionary identifications increase migrant vulnerability by linking human rights to state-based citizenship, leaving the stateless and those whose origin states are "insufficiently secure" on perilous legal ground, even as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights fails to insure safe spaces for those in need of asylum ([Ne vins, 2017](#)).

States engage in practices designed to monitor, control and deter the movement of undesired migrants (e.g., [Hyndman, 2012](#); [Johnson, Jones, Amore, Mountz, & Rumford, 2011](#); [Jones et al., 2017](#); [Steinberg, 2018](#); [Vaughan-Williams, 2015](#)), with evolving border enforcement (e.g., [Jones & Johnson, 2016](#)), and policing and detention beyond the border (e.g., [Mountz, 2011](#)). Acknowledging these perils, scholars have highlighted the agency exercised by migrants as they subvert EU efforts to manage unwanted migration (e.g., [Dempsey, 2018](#); [Innes, 2016](#)), which can include digital technology (e.g., social media and GPS) to help them navigate their transnational journeys ([Popescu, 2017](#)).

Underpinning the contemporary procedures governing EU states' borders and international migration are reactionary and defensive "homeland" narratives (e.g., [Cowen & Gilbert, 2008](#)). Since the Schengen Convention (1990), fear of irregular border crossing into adjacent territory became paramount in some EU states, (e.g., Italy, France, Hungary, and Cyprus) whose governments framed "illegal" migration into Europe as a security threat and a political act analogous to an invasion (e.g., [Dempsey & McDowell, 2019](#); [Mountz & Hiemstra, 2014](#)).

As [Jones](#) argues, states are complex networks with "links between

state and civil society, crucially mediated by citizenship, national socialization and other mediated forms of governance ... via state (space) and the daily lives of citizens and non-citizens" (2016, p. 9). The presence of a border encourages violence against irregular migrants, while simultaneously producing privilege of movement for others. He argues that "most violence and deaths at borders occur because of new enforcement technologies, from walls to drones and high-technology sensors, make the crossing more difficult and dangerous" (Jones, 2016, p. 8). Some EU states discourage or prohibit irregular migration through supranational agencies like Frontex, as well as geopolitical readmission agreements with bordering states to externalize its migration controls and buffer Europe by re-making the world beyond it (Bialasiewicz, 2015).

Migrants who reach EU asylum camps face various forms of violence that continue or are produced in spaces of protracted waiting. The host state limits migrants' movement and agency throughout the lengthy asylum and/or deportation process (e.g., Minca, 2015; Moran, 2015). Hyndman (2012) argues migrants are increasingly trapped in a "long-term limbo" in which their mobility is limited and controlled as they are coded as geopolitical and welfare threats within the host state. Other scholars have exposed the violence that irregular migrants face while waiting (e.g., Davies & Isakjee, 2015). Even if granted asylum, migrants many wait months or years for housing, education and training, and/or family reunification. Consequently, migrants suffer violence as abandonment by the host country or forced relocation to a series of camps with "conditions that consign large numbers of people to lead short and limited lives" (Li, 2010, 3).

While such research sheds light on specific cases of violence, it presents only pieces of a larger composite. A typology of violence experienced in different geopolitical spaces can provide an analytical framework through which disparate research projects on violence against migrants can be collaboratively focused on forces and regulations that underpin and produce such violence.

### 3. Methodology

This paper is based on fieldwork conducted with migrants in over 25 different asylum camps located in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden during May–July 2016 and 2017. Migrant accommodation ranged from former prisons and container camps to tent-camps and, in some rare cases, individual private housing. While this project also included participant observation and interviews with Red Cross members, social workers, and translators, this discussion draws primarily from the 54 interviews with migrants in asylum camps, each 1–3 h long and focusing on violence experienced throughout migration. Participants were contacted and recruited through local social workers, the author and asylum seekers' networks, the Red Cross, and camp ambassadors. The semi-structured interviews, scheduled for convenience and personal comfort of participants, took place in private rooms within the camps or in a separate room at Red Cross facilities. All interviews were conducted in English or French or facilitated through a translator (participant's preference) and recorded with participants' permission (49 by voice recorder and 5 by hand; participant's preference), then transcribed for coding and analysis. All fieldwork strictly followed the Human Subjects protocol specified by the Institutional Review Board. Guided by ethics and awareness of participant vulnerability (e.g., Maillet et al., 2016), interviews employed the negotiated positionalities methodology of reciprocal interviewing (Dempsey, 2018), which allows participants to inquire about the interviewer's personal life, including experiences of violence, in order to dampen power inequities of the interview process and mitigate some of the violence of interviewing.

The goal of this project was to develop a conceptual framework to facilitate research and theory-building relating to spaces and forms that EU asylum seekers experience. The data collected from interviews with migrants from different countries of origin, genders, religious/spiritual backgrounds, class, age, and family status is not intended to present a

homogenized representation of "the migrant," asylum camps, or any one individual's journey. Rather, by incorporating data collected from various locations, situations, and individuals, this project aims to highlight some of the key commonalities and mechanisms relating to the exposure and experience of violence(s) across space.

### 4. Typology and research agenda

The pervasive violence that migrants experience in their source, transit and host states raises the need to identify and expose how and why violence is perpetrated. Given the complex political geography of violence against migrants, the challenge is to describe various forms of violence experienced across space as a result of conflict, geopolitical structuring(s) of security, mobility, citizenship and the politics of asylum. Research has often employed geographically specific case studies to yield powerful evidence of enumerable violations against migrants but has not provided a comprehensive composite. A typology of violence that migrants experience in different spaces may impose some order on the kaleidoscope, and guide research and theory-building pertaining to forms of violence may emerge in a particular space. It also provides a theoretical framework for focusing disparate research projects on violence against migrants and drawing attention to how state forces and regulations foster such violence. While each migrant will experience violence uniquely, the proposed typology will identify common patterns, motivations, and narratives.

This paper aims to address how forced migration cuts across different states, sovereign territories, and social contracts, to ask: How and why might violence produced by state and non-state actors vary across different spaces?

### 5. Typology

The following typology is derived from analysis of interviews that revealed five categories of violence: (1) physical, (2) verbal, (3) psychological, (4) sexual, (5) and non-linear (disrupted potential for a life with some stability and growth/life integrity), across three geopolitical spaces: (A) source/origin state, (B) transit/transitional state(s), and (C) EU host state. While there are other categorizations of violence (e.g., WHO, 2002), this typology and violence categorization emerged during interviews and data analysis that revealed five predominant types consistently noted in interviews (with frequent overlap, e.g., physical and sexual; sexual and verbal). Interviewees were asked to discuss violence encountered throughout their journeys and how they would classify/rank the experiences. The structure of the typology is a product of the magnitude participants assigned to each categorized incident and total occurrences (Charmaz, 2006). For example, the majority of interviewees commonly highlighted non-linear violence during interviews as a form of "suffering," enduring long waits in camps for decisions on asylum applications while being barred from work or traveling outside their host state. Further discussions of non-linear violence in other geographic locations evolved from these descriptions.

Due to the complex interactions and multi-dimensional nature of a migrant's experience, categories were created for heuristic purposes and are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the boundaries among these categories are often blurred; violence often includes components from multiple categories. Moreover, state processes stretch beyond physical borders and across liminal space(s), with notable variances among EU states and their asylum policies. Violence varies across the different stages that comprise forced migration. This typology serves as an analytical tool to better understand how and why certain forms of violence against migrants occur in certain spaces, even as sovereign governance has become increasingly disseminated, diversified, and ubiquitous. The typology illustrates how different spaces structure the kinds of violence one can anticipate in different spaces. The ordering and discussion of forms of violence in each of the three categorical spaces reflects the prominence of a particular form of violence identified in

interview discussions or a significant contrast for that space.

### 5.1. Violence in the source state

While all five forms of violence in this typology were reported for interviewees' origin states, physical violence against civilians was the most common, followed by non-linear and sexual. Scholars who study violent conflict and its diffusion have focused on many of the interviewees' source states (e.g., Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya) and subsequent forced migrations (e.g., Flint, 2005; O'Loughlin, Witmer, & Linke, 2010). The connection between war-torn or failed states and violence is well known, as politically destabilized environments often foster terrorism, state and vigilante violence, and deprivation that can motivate citizens to support or engage in extreme acts of violence (e.g., Flint, 2005). For all interviewees, the social contract has broken down, while sovereign borders render it difficult for the global community to intervene. The devastating effects of such violence on infrastructure, environment and access to quality healthcare (Dempsey, Qureshi, Ondoma, & Dempsey, 2017), in turn, produce additional violence and emigration. Several key structural forces are commonly believed to fuel a collapse in governance, including infrastructure and transportation (e.g., O'Loughlin et al., 2010). Indeed, when state laws, protection (e.g., security forces are disbanded, displaced or even directed at the public), and rights break down, the resultant collapse impacts security, health care, living standards and education for citizens.

#### 5.1.1. Physical

Inhabitants are more likely to be exposed to certain forms of violence (e.g., bombing campaigns, terrorism, torture, etc.) in the source state than when traveling through or waiting in more stabilized states (e.g., attacks by smugglers or border police). Physical violence can be extremely traumatic and often includes verbal and psychological components. Fueled by sectarian conflict, civil wars, terrorism, and other geopolitical conflicts, physical violence - or its imminent threat - was the most common motivating factor that interviewees identified for leaving their country of origin. Despite diverse backgrounds, all participants in this project fled war-torn, failed or failing states. For example, many Syrians fled attacks on anti-government protesters beginning in 2011. As violence intensified, instances of extreme violence, kidnapping and civilian deaths rose sharply throughout the country and Al-Assad's aerial bombing campaign fueled further conflict. With physical torture, rape, murder and other war crimes increasingly pervasive, over four million Syrians fled the state by November 2015 (UNHCR, 2019).

Similar violence against civilians at the hand of state and non-state actors was commonly reported by interviewees from Afghanistan and Iraq, with accounts of brutal corporeal violence, torture, and executions at the hands of the Taliban, "warlords," or other forces, including in some cases by family members - (consistent with accounts from international media and the UNHCR (Panter-Brick, Eggerman, Gonzalez, & Safdar, 2009). In addition, eyewitnesses often described US-led coalition forces' bombing campaigns in Afghanistan as irrational and ruthless. Similarly, over three-fourths of Iraqi asylum seekers in Syria were injured in bombing raids or rocket attacks, and over half had been beaten during a government interrogation before fleeing Iraq (UNHCR, 2015). An Iraqi asylum seeker explained: "The government believed my brother was a rebel and tortured me to find him. Since I didn't know, they continued to torture me" (interview #10, 2016).

Unsurprisingly, individuals in areas lacking stability and political order commonly experience increasing physical violence, terrorism and savage acts of cruelty e.g., (Holland, Witmer, & O'Loughlin, 2017; O'Loughlin, Witmer, & Linke, 2010), where states have little or no accountability or organized territorial control. These states are unable to regulate internal violence and protect their citizens, resulting in lives are lost, families uprooted and torn apart, and food and supply networks.

#### 5.1.2. Non-Linear

The next most significant form of violence identified by migrants was non-linear, which is defined here as the disruption, obstruction, deprivation or denial of the opportunity to pursue a life that otherwise may have included some stability and potential for growth. Commonly as a result of extreme violence or poverty, some states fail to provide fundamental necessities and basic functions such as security, education, or fair governance. This deprives individuals of opportunities for healthy growth, employment, health care or other important resources, mobility, and family life. Disrupting school-age children's access to education can cause "mental health problems, learning disabilities, language impairments, and other neurocognitive problems" (Perkins & Graham-Bermann, 2012, 89). Various forms of non-linear violence are particularly pervasive in war-torn states and during irregular migration manifest as uncertainty, disruption, and impediment to movement and stability.

While participants identified the interruption or denial of productive lives as a significant form of violence in all spatial categories, the manifestation and function of non-linear violence varied by location. All participants experienced non-linear violence in their source state as access to food, health care, family members, employment, and other necessities were disrupted or denied by violent conflict, its imminent threat, or severe infrastructural damage. However, in the source state, migrants explained that the disruption involved their most immediate needs, which may include food, communication, and education. This also regularly included the disruption of Internet, cellphone, landline telephone, and television, which hinders information-gathering and contact with loved ones, particularly in times of crisis. Fundamental services for children, including access to education, likewise are often absent. As a Syrian mother explained:

It was too dangerous to send my children to school. It was too far to walk and the damage from the bombing meant no car or bus. After a few months, all schools in the city closed. It was not safe for children (interview #1, 2016).

The spatial context and variation in impact of non-linear violence in different states is telling: interviewees explained it was "more painful" to wait and waste time in a foreign place (e.g., transitional and EU host state), as discussed in subsequent sections.

#### 5.1.3. Sexual

The WHO defines sexual violence as "any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed, against a person's sexuality using coercion, by any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting and can include rape or other forms of assault involving a sexual organ" (WHO, 2002, p. 149). Sexual violence can also profoundly impact physical and mental health (Campbell, 2013). In the midst of the geopolitical collapse of a state, the resultant chaos and disruption of order produces a spatial context in which sexual violence is more likely to occur, particularly as a tactic of war or a form of weaponry. Over one-fifth of all participants, from multiple genders including men, reported rape or other forms of sexual violence at the hands of combatant groups in war-torn states such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. As one male participant explained, "When the government arrested me, they bounded and raped me many times while they held me in a cell for days" (interview #45, 2017).

Instead of categorizing rape and sexual assault committed during war or conflict as a violation of humanitarian law, such attacks were historically perceived as "collateral damage" or "inevitable pillage" of war (Farwell, 2004). Many feminist scholars also "advocate for recognizing (particular forms of) sexual violence as torture — labelling it as 'sexual torture' as acts that fulfill the definitions of both categories" (Gray & Stern, 2019, p. 1036). Only in the last few decades have perceptions shifted to frame the violation as a weaponized and targeted act

of terror (WHO, 2002). As Farwell argues, “Military and insurgency groups have increasingly used rape as a weapon, systematically targeting women in the enemy group to achieve political objectives such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, and occupation of enemy territory” (2004, p. 389). There are numerous examples of systemic rape against multiple genders by military forces and state-sponsored sexual violence e.g., (Gray & Stern, 2019), but it was not until the UN ordered a report on sexual violence in 1998 that the systematic use of rape during war was labeled a crime against humanity.

Psychologists classify sexual violence as one of the most severe forms of trauma, resulting in numerous and chronic mental health disorders including depression, Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), long-term physical health problems, suicidal thoughts or actions, and continued sexual victimization (Kilpatrick & Acierno, 2003). In addition, “rape victims have extensive post-assault needs and may turn to multiple social systems for assistance”; without support, victims may continue to suffer heightened fear and anxiety, PTSD, depression, lower self-esteem and poorer social adjustment (Campbell, 2013, p. 703). All interviewees identified transitional states as the greatest source of sexual violence.

#### 5.1.4. Psychological

The WHO defines psychological abuse as “characterized by a person subjecting or exposing another person to behavior that may result in psychological trauma, including anxiety, chronic depression, or PTSD. This may include bullying, intimidation, insults and humiliation or as a result of acute or prolonged human rights abuses, particularly without legal redress such as detention without trial, false convictions or extreme defamation” (WHO, 2002, p. 16). While physical and verbal violence can have a devastating and often acute impact on an individual, the effects of psychological violence can be enduring and equally devastating (MPI et al., 2015). For example, one Afghan interviewee recounted that after members of the Taliban kidnapped his brother from their home, they routinely returned to their home to intimidate his family. He developed panic attacks triggered by the sound of approaching vehicles (interview #53, 2017). The emotional toll of witnessing their source state’s demise and violence within its borders were commonly identified as a particularly painful form of unanticipated betrayal. As one interviewee explained, “I expected pain and violence traveling along a dangerous journey to Europe, but never in my country!” (interview #21, 2017). Impacts that begin in the source state often continue and worsen throughout their journey. In fact, most migrants reported the psychological violence in the source and transition (s) states as part of the “same journey.” Therefore, this combined discussion appears in the transitional state section.

#### 5.1.5. Verbal

Medical research suggests that exposure to repeated verbal abuse is related to “elevated psychiatric symptom scores and corpus callosum abnormalities,” including what researchers identified as substantial “alterations in brain structure” (Teicher, 2010, p. 1461). This includes racist or other dehumanizing and humiliating language toward minorities (e.g. ethnic, religious, sexual, etc.). For example, one Sindhi Pakistani interviewee explained how his coworkers repeatedly used discriminatory and xenophobic language to verbally abuse him at work. While verbal violence does not include a physical component, there is a notable overlap with psychological violence. Spoken violence dominates, but written (graffiti, death threats in letters) and social media trolling also occurred. While all interviewees experienced verbal violence in the source and transitional states, they universally categorized it as the least impactful while in those spaces compared to geopolitical non-citizen categorization of “Otherness” in the host states. Therefore, the morphology of this violence will be discussed in the host state context.

This typology can help frame research questions on violence in the source state by emphasizing the interaction of different geopolitical forces and features of violence in these spaces. For example, one could

investigate how the high prevalence of physical, non-linear and sexual violence in source states contrasts with that of transitional or host states. Conversely, projects could compare the disparate manifestations and influences of verbal violence in source states with that in EU host states.

### 5.2. Violence in the transitional state(s)

In this study, a transitional state is defined as one through which a migrant traveled, outside of the source state, before arriving in an EU host state. The decision to travel to Europe is not easily made, nor is the individual EU state where migrants were encountered for this project always the original destination. For example, several interviewees had lived in asylum camps in Syria or Jordan, where resources eventually dwindled “compounded by an economic crisis, increases in criminality and vulnerability, as well as limited access to clean water, food and health care” (UNHCR, 2018, 4), before they decided to attempt to enter Europe. In the context of global migration, unequal regulation of mobility, migration governance, border control, and containment efforts are facilitated through the spatial organization and stretching of sovereign state power. Indeed, states that respond to irregular migration by reasserting control via expanded territorial claims also are eliminating access to relatively safe travel modes and increasing migrant vulnerability (Nevins, 2018). This includes offshore and externalized interdiction and asylum processing (Collyer, 2010), which the state justifies through narratives that frame migrants as threats to national security, classifying and entrenching migrants in space constructed by state processes, and limiting their mobility with state efforts to securitize migration. In order to more aggressively manage irregular migration, many states extend their borders to effectively impede migration before migrants reach their desired country (e.g., Coleman, 2007). Migrants may react to various state bordering and asylum procedures by attempting to exploit irregular ones. The discriminatory illegalization of “unwanted” migrants slows their mobility and fosters smuggler networks that exacerbate the plight of migrants attempting clandestine border crossings (Nevins, 2008, 2018).

#### 5.2.1. Physical

Physical violence remained the most reported form by migrants traveling through transitional states. As non-citizen bodies moving through geopolitical spaces framed within the state-based system of sovereignty, irregular migrants are marked as foreign and denied the rights and protections enjoyed by many of the citizens within the states in which they travel. Simultaneously, they are targeted by EU bordering processes and transnational “deterrence policies,” the material manifestations of state practices that conduct aggressive “front-end” migration interceptions and extend beyond borderlines to stem and repel flows of irregular migrants. These efforts are “justified” by narratives of national security and combating human trafficking (Jones, 2016). Several EU bilateral anti-immigration agreements with neighboring states cull migration destined for Europe from states such as Morocco and Libya as part of what Mountz (2011) called the increasingly “shrinking spaces of asylum.”

As states’ border securitization diversifies, these practices become more transnational and violent, and migrants’ precariousness increases. With few provisions or fail-safes for migrant human rights, the external borders of the EU have become the world’s most dangerous to cross (Jones, 2016; UNHCR, 2018). As border patrolling increases and conventional immigration routes are limited by militarization and surveillance technology, migrants face dramatically increased risk of violence as they attempt to subvert EU border enforcement on irregular migration routes. As these alternative routes become better known, they draw more smugglers as well as locals, police, and border patrol, who have assaulted and/or detained migrants in spatially enacted border violence. Interviewees who were held in Libyan detention camps experienced beatings, extortion, and electroshock torture during their confinement (e.g., interviews #5, 19, 21, 2016; 2017). As one interviewee explained,

“In Libya, sometimes the guards would beat me with baton and said they would not stop until I paid them, but I had no money to give them” (interview #19, 2016).

The smugglers that many migrants employed to facilitate their journey were also a significant source of physical violence, as they often exploited Europe’s efforts at securitizing migration to gain power, produce fear, and manipulate their passengers by threatening to turn them into border enforcement. Most migrants reported that their smuggler beat anyone who fell behind, helped those who were struggling, or tried to flee. Reports of violent deaths or robberies were also ubiquitous in the interviews. Most reported that they were held against their will for extended periods in cramped and dirty “staging houses,” as they tried to hide from police to avoid detention.

Individual EU countries may be transitional states for migrants who try to circumvent the Dublin III Regulation’s requirement that migrants biometrically register and submit asylum applications in the first EU member-state they enter. As they attempt to travel clandestinely throughout the EU, migrants are exposed to further physical violence at the hands of police, border authorities, hate groups, and vigilantes who patrol some of the popular migration routes within Europe. The uneven asylum policies in the EU, efforts to monitor and regulate movement through the Dublin III Regulation, and bilateral readmission agreements not only “illustrate the internal fractiousness of the EU, in spite of language about unification, harmonization, and the elusive objective of common asylum policy” (Mountz & Loyd, 2013, p. 175), but also drive many to undertake additional treacherous leg(s) of their journey after arriving at the EU border.

### 5.2.2. Sexual

Reports of sexual violence increased in transitional states in comparison to source and host states. The transitory nature of the clandestine journeys that irregular migrants undergo exposes them to numerous unknown locations and persons, while the state-centric perceptions of belonging, citizenship and responsibility often preclude or prevent these individuals from protection under local laws or basic rights afforded by the 1951 Refugee Convention. While having a home does not eliminate sexual violence, most participants believed that the lack of “protective accommodations” or presence of protective family member/friend(s) during their “illegal” journey exacerbated this risk. For example, a female asylum seeker was raped by police after they removed her from a public bus during an anti-migration raid on major transportation routes to Europe. Six other interviewees, including two men, reported being raped by border guards or police sometime during their international journey.

Many of the victims believed the clandestine nature of the “illegal” journey made them particularly vulnerable to sexual violence, although the covert nature of their travel was not solely responsible. Interviewees of all genders reported such attacks both in private secluded areas and within view of others - sometimes family or friends. This occurred at the hands of smugglers, bandits and, in some cases, local police and border guards. The latter may justify detention of irregular migrants as part of a humanitarian effort to stop human smuggling (Jones, 2016), reflecting a common perception that migrants’ lacking citizenship have no legal recourse or human rights.

Migrants’ mode of travel correlated with the likelihood of sexual violence, with those who traveled by truck or boat reporting fewer instances than those who traveled by foot. However, no mode of transportation guarantees protection. For example, one interviewee reported that she was being transported by smugglers with her husband in a truck but was pulled out and raped until her husband could pay more money to protect her (interview #38, 2017). Additionally, the precarious nature of irregular, clandestine travel also increases migrants’ exposure to those who prey sexually on these individuals. As one interviewee explained, the smuggler with whom he traveled raped individuals in his group repeatedly on their journey and threatened to report them to the authorities if they resisted. Many interviewees were told that smugglers

often expect rape as an additional fee for passage.

Three adult migrants who had lived in asylum camps in a transitional state also reported being raped or sexually exploited by camp guards, and an interviewee was raped by another migrant in the camp (interviews #6, 21, 37, 41, 54, 2016; 2017). Rape generally does not receive attention or medical assistance in transitional states—a finding supported by a medical assessment on sexual violence against asylum seekers in the Middle East. According to that report, “there are no viable comprehensive medical options for survivors of rape. Considered taboo and seen as a family issue, rape survivors are left with nowhere to go to seek clinical care. Treatments to prevent HIV, unwanted pregnancy, or sexually transmitted infections require immediate action, such as the 72-h window for HIV prophylaxis. This lack of access to care has emerged as a humanitarian crisis all of its own” (Ouyang, 2013, p. 2165).

### 5.2.3. Non-Linear

While these clandestine journeys are extremely strenuous, perilous, and violent, they are also rarely linear or continuous, often being interrupted or fragmented as migrants travel through transitional states (e.g., Kaytaz, 2016). Participants universally testified that they had not expected the journey to be so lengthy. Migrants constantly feel “out of place” in a continual process of dislocation as they travel via fragmented, precarious stages of mobility for months or years (Collyer, 2010). They face numerous linguistic, logistic, cultural, and economic barriers; lack of Internet access or cellular connections in transitional states further impedes migrants from accessing important information and communicating with loved ones. In between their various disjointed journeys, migrants often hide in poor or dangerous accommodations waiting for the opportunity and financial resources to initiate the next leg. Frequently these periods of immobility are quite lengthy, even if a smuggler organizes the journey. Migrant journeys can also be disrupted or suddenly terminated by detention and deportation; if deported, many try to emigrate again. These and other forms of non-linear violence represent lost time, financial resources, and opportunities for migrants.

Some participants had not originally planned to travel to Europe, then discovered that the asylum policies where they were staying, such as those in Turkey, are particularly disruptive for families with children. Turkey does not provide classroom translators and bars school-age asylum seekers from enrolling in school until they can prove proficiency in Turkish (MPI et al., 2015). Similarly, secondary school attendance of Iraqi and Syrian children in Lebanese asylum camps was extremely low, with 91% of girls in asylum camps not studying (UNHCR, 2019). As one Syrian explained:

I wanted my son to go to school. But the school said he did not speak Turkish. He speaks Arabic and some English! He will learn Turkish in school! I asked, can they find someone who speaks Arabic in the classroom? They said no (interview #1, 2016).

Many of the Mediterranean EU states’ bordering regulations produce non-linear violence against migrants as patrols extend beyond EU sovereign territory into liminal maritime spaces and along the North African coast in an effort to impede migrants from reaching Europe. Tazzioli (2018) argues that EU states expand their reach in order to trap migrants in protracted periods of waiting in “border-zones” outside the EU’s asylum system.

The Dublin III Regulation also produces a form of non-linear violence against those who try to subvert this transnational obligation; surreptitious movement exposes them to further violence, kidnapping, or extortion as they travel without protection, often across vast distances. Additionally, asylum applications may be rejected if a migrant’s fingerprints have already been registered elsewhere. Thus, state power penetrates the daily lives of migrants through various authority figures (e.g., police, judge, bureaucrats, camp guards) and legal silence, constituting pervasive structural geopolitical violence.

#### 5.2.4. Psychological

Psychological violence that begun in the source state may continue and be exacerbated by similar or new trauma in the transitional state. Some psychologists believe the scars from this violence may never heal completely, as evidence suggests “exposure to continuous, distressing and potentially traumatic events, depletion of resources, forced displacement and lack of security can all negatively impact mental health and increase risk of maladaptation” (OCHA, Charles, & Denman, 2013, 12). In a joint assessment, the UN and Syrian Government identified “mental health and psychological support as one of the most urgent concerns” (OCHA et al., 2013) resulting from the war in Syria and war-related events in Afghanistan.

Many interviewees were previously victims and/or witnessed brutal attacks on family member(s) or acquaintances while living in or fleeing a combat zone (e.g., rocket explosions, shootings, and murders); this trauma was compounded by further psychological violence that occurred throughout their journey. Many reported being extremely homesick, frightened, and horrified by the conditions of the journey. All who traveled with a smuggler reported being deceived regarding the extent of the travel. Families were commonly separated along the journey, particularly if they traveled with smugglers, who often divided migrant groups to match age, gender, and body types of forged travel documents. This was intensely distressing, with no assurances or plans for reunification, as some families were separated for hours, days or weeks before being reunited.

All participants believed, at least once, that they would die on the journey, and carried that fear with them for the remainder of their journey. Many were robbed, some even by their smuggler or a co-conspirator—a betrayal that generated psychological distress and distrust of the person(s) they paid for safe passage. Many were forced into claustrophobic conditions inside a hidden compartment in the smuggler’s truck without proper ventilation for days in extreme heat as they crossed borders. All interviewees reported psychological trauma from experiencing or witnessing abuse, kidnapping, or death. When the violence was caused by a state actor, it compounded the migrant’s feeling of helplessness. One Syrian woman who had been raped by police after being removed from a train in Croatia explained, “I had traveled to Europe because I thought it valued freedom and security, but I experienced none of that here. I left Syria to avoid what I suffered on my journey here” (interview #9, 2016).

Such psychological distress is compounded over time by other experiences, as well as the fear of being captured, detained and deported, motivating many to adhere to smugglers’ demands to avoid border guards and the threat of torture in detention. Participants who traveled through Libya reported hearing or witnessing Libyan detention guards intentionally releasing detainees only to recapture them and demand bribes for their release (interviews 2016 & 2017), producing an “organized and lucrative industry of exploitation” (JRS, 2009).

Life in asylum camps included new and continued psychological violence exacerbated by the violence of separation and abandonment. Interviewees who stayed in camps in Turkey were given few resources and limited health services. A medical study on refugee camps revealed those who are separated or “removed from supportive social networks manifested very high levels of trauma and 10 times the Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) compared to children around the world; adults in asylum camps manifest a high rate of Depression and PTSD symptoms; and rape victims were not receiving necessary mental health care.” Indeed, studies suggest “psychological stress and desperation intensified as the length of stay in the camps increased” (MPI et al., 2015). Migrants who stayed in transitional states’ asylum camps such as Jordan or Turkey reported feeling marginalized and neglected.

#### 5.2.5. Verbal

Migrants reported various forms verbal violence in transitional states that revealed xenophobic attitudes against irregular migrants from local inhabitants and police. As one interviewee explained, “In a Bulgarian

market, people shouted that I was dirty, parasitic, and human garbage” (interview #20, 2016).

#### 5.3. Violence in the EU host state

In EU host states, sovereignty and migration legislation intersects with conditions “constituted by a number of other power relationship such as colonialism, class, and gender relations” (Jones, 2016, p. 96). As foreign non-citizens, migrants are governed under the host state’s asylum laws, with treatment increasingly deviating from the social contract extrapolated from international asylum laws. Paradoxically, migrants reported that violence in host states surpasses what they experienced in previous geopolitical spaces. Unlike the previous spaces, the most prominently reported forms of violence in the host state were non-linear, psychological and verbal violence, which reflects both the geopolitical space and its impact on migrant experience and perceptions.

##### 5.3.1. Non-Linear

Perceived threats of migration are corroding migrants’ ability to claim asylum, as it becomes increasingly challenging to enter a state where they can utilize that right. The unequal power balance between states and migrants is also evident in states’ selective interpretation and individual standards for asylum regulations and human rights laws, which are governed by contemporary geopolitical relations that may greatly impact the treatment of asylum claims. Indeed, as state bureaucratic processes and regulations’ regarding migrants proliferate within and beyond territorial borders (Coleman, 2007), they also invoke orientaling narratives underpinned by fear, insecurity, and racist imaginaries to justify the control and/or “violent abandonment” of migrants (e.g., Davies & Isakjee, 2015; Gilbert & Ponder, 2014). The violence of state practices regulating and controlling migrant bodies is built into the structure of migrant legislation, concealed in the praxis of bureaucracies, of an “unequal power structure that produces unequal life chances” (Jones, 2016). Migrants’ legal status within the state both limits their mobility confining unwanted migrants away from society and preserves a segregated perception of their nation (Malkki, 2002). Camp residents must comply with weekly electronic fingerprint scans or lose their subsistence funds for that week. In this way, host states both reduce these individuals into coded objects and regulate their movement, creating dependent beings whose mobility and legal status are both limited and controlled by the state.

At the same time, migrants are suspended in a state of continuous disruption or dislocation as they are forced to move through a series of camps while awaiting a decision. During this time, their right to mobility, employment, or education is postponed, often for several years (Hyndman, 2012). For example, all interviewees were relocated to 3–6 different camps after arriving in their host state, and many were forced to change rooms unexpectedly several times within a single camp. State and private asylum camps generate a process of displacement, alienation, and vulnerability for these migrants. As one of the Swedish social workers explained, migrants often believe that their host state has created a “labyrinth of camps” through which many migrants are forced to travel through forced relocation (interview #19, 2016). These frequent changes can further compound migrants’ stress and anxiety, generating feelings of precariousness, fear, loneliness, and hopelessness stemming from lack of clarity in the asylum process and the reality of their perceived abandonment. As one woman from Syria explained, “I was least prepared for this suffering in Europe. You expect violence in a war-torn country and traveling with smugglers, but I did not expect to be held in a “prison-like” camp, like a criminal for fleeing to Europe.” Most reported feeling unwelcome, uncomfortable, or fearful living in the camps. This is perhaps due to the guards’ implicit policy of discouraging a comfortable living environment, “so the migrants don’t want to stay here” (COA guard interview, 2016).

Indeed, all participants were extremely upset about lost months or years of their lives as they wait for their host state’s decision on asylum,

education, housing, and job opportunities. The non-linear violence migrants experience through such disruptions and abandonment can have serious long-term implications, particularly for children. During waiting periods of a year or more, migrant children have limited access to public schools. Research reveals that children who suffered an emotional trauma, such as forced migration, and then experience-disrupted access to education, are at risk for struggling academically and developing cognitive, social, and emotional problems (MPI et al., 2015). As one Afghan interviewee lamented:

All we do here is wait. We wait for word on our asylum papers, language classes, and our requests for housing, health care, and reuniting with family. We wait ... all we do is wait (interview #48, 2017).

### 5.3.2. Psychological

As asylum seekers face the realities of “de facto abandonment” in asylum camps, feelings of anxiety and desperation only increase the longer they are forced to wait (e.g., Katz, 2017; Ramadan, 2013). Very few were prepared for the psychological duress of what the UNHCR calls an “intractable state of limbo” (2015), and most participants identified waiting in these asylum camps as the most difficult element of their migration. This reflects not only the host state’s violent abandonment of migrants, and memories from their homes and journeys, but also their precarious future within this new state. Unlike the source and transition states, which participants felt they could leave in search of a safer destination, Dublin III Regulation makes the host state a terminal finality should their asylum application be rejected.

The pervasive systemic and structural inequalities in asylum camps inflict psychological violence on migrants, who are forced to live in crowded rooms and repeatedly moved among camps. Such resettlement is particularly stressful for those who have been exposed to violence, war, sexual violence, and removal from supportive familial and social networks, often facing discrimination in addition to cultural and linguistic barriers.

Indeed, the perimeter fences, densely crowded accommodations, and frequent transfers to other camps lead many to believe they are treated like animals. They become objects of surveillance where their mobility and legal status is determined and controlled by the host state, but their psychological needs often go unaddressed for years (UNHCR, 2015, p. 106). Comparisons of camp accommodations to prisons natural, given that camps such as Dutch Koepelgevangenis were previously used as prisons. In addition to the bare accommodations or places originally constructed to house criminals, many were concerned that their containment within these spaces also bolstered public perceptions of irregular migration as criminal act. Migrants lamented the lack of privacy, quiet areas, cooking/food preparation facilities, and spaces for religious practices within the camps (Dempsey, 2018).

Unable to work, migrants’ financial dependence on the state contributes to a feeling of vulnerability they did not expect to experience upon arriving in Europe. Traumatized by the violence they experienced before arriving in Europe, feelings of insecurity and a precarious future in Europe, survivors’ guilt, displacement, isolation, and separation from family and friends, many interviewees reported an acute sense of loss, separation, fear, and depression as they are forced to wait for asylum decisions. This is particularly notable for unaccompanied minors. As research demonstrated, family support corresponds with lower prevalence of PTSD symptoms among Syrian youth research participants (UNHCR, 2019; MPI et al., 2015). Doctors who evaluate incoming EU asylum seekers reported, “many individuals experienced extremely psychologically distressing conditions while traveling to the EU” (interview with camp doctor, 2016). While a camp may have access to doctor, they do not offer mental health care, and clinical appointments are rare. As a result, depression, PTSD, panic attacks and anxiety commonly go underreported and untreated in the camps. Untreated

depression, PTSD, and other mental illness in the camps have manifested in many ways, including a high rate of suicide, with 13 successful and 80 attempted suicides in the first six months of 2014 in the Netherlands alone (UNHCR, 2015).

However, the universal fear for migrants waiting in camps is asylum rejection and deportation. The impact of state asylum policies and intrastate geopolitical relations’ weighs heavily on individuals as they bear witness to rulings on others’ applications and await decisions on their own. For example, Syrians are systematically prioritized as “non-economic” forced migrants within the EU asylum process, experience faster processing times, and are offered larger accommodations. In contrast, other nationalities such as Eritreans or Afghani that often categorized as “economic, voluntary” migrants statically face higher rates of asylum rejection and smaller accommodations (UNHCR, 2019). As one 18-year-old asylum seeker from Afghanistan explained, “One of the boys in my room arrived in camp when I did. We are the same age. We both fled violent conflicts at home, converted to Christianity, but he was granted asylum because he was Syrian. I did not, because I am not a “desirable” migrant. I am not Syrian” (interview #3, 2016). Migrants’ bodies are therefore geopolitically bound to their source state, a violent form of categorization that can significantly influence the likelihood of gaining asylum and reveals how host states function as “gatekeepers” that select which migrants deserve asylum within their borders.

### 5.3.3. Verbal

While verbal violence was experienced in all three state spaces, migrants commonly described the significant “power” of its destructiveness in the host state. In the source and transition states, it often manifested through threats or slurs directed at individuals. However, in host states, it also forms geopolitical categorizations of difference and unbelonging within their asylum legislation. For example, while the general term “migrant” can refer broadly to a person in transit, the categorical term marks migrant bodies as “out of place” within a state (Cresswell, 2006), and specific legal terms can influence their chances of gaining asylum. Maillet et al. (2016) argue that legal terms and labels utilized by states are particularly significant as the categories such as “illegal” or “refugee” determine states’ responsibility towards and power over each migrant. Gregory (2004) argues that categories and representations, including the labels that states create and assign to migrants, are a form of violence. These terms also serve to legally control, and in some cases neglect, migrants with discourse that also may produce stereotypes and justify violence against or mistreatment of migrants. Through a series of state-controlled territorial and governance laws as well as exclusionary rhetoric that cultivate “boundaries of belonging” (Adamson, Triadafilopoulos, & Zolberg, 2011), migrants are marked as foreign, rendered “out of place,” and categorized as geopolitical and welfare threats within the host state (e.g., Hungry, Romania, Denmark, and France) serving to subjugate migrants with labels that categorize citizenship and denote “Otherness.”

These violent labels and geopolitical articulations of difference are also pervasive throughout the media—main avenues through which states communicate “key messages” to the public. Particularly since 9/11, they have increasingly used alarmist terms to frame migration, linking it to terrorism and national security in an effort to justify their methods for securitizing migration. Much of the European media perpetuated various forms of verbal violence by equating the arrival of international migrants to a natural disaster or security threat. Categorizing migrants as non-human and menacing entities insinuates that their presence within Europe is a form of invasion (e.g., Dempsey & McDowell, 2019). This highlights what Haldrup, Koefoed, and Simonsen (2006, 174) call the “new orientalism in politics” as ultra-nationalist political organizations within Europe label international migrants as “Other” and argue that the state has the responsibility to curtail immigration to protect European values and freedom.

Interviewees experienced other forms of verbal violence during banal interactions with local inhabitants, in asylum camps, or through



targeted hate speech in public graffiti. Minors attending school are categorized as “alien” pupils. These geopolitical labels violently mark migrant bodies as sites of difference and reaffirms racist perceptions of belonging. Most migrants, regardless of age, reported being victims of myriad racist verbal violence such as “terrorists,” “rapists,” or “cowards who fled” by local authorities, doctors, police, and the public. One young man openly wept in an interview when he recounted a Dutch woman in a grocery calling him “Al-Qaeda” - the same terrorist group that had recently killed his brother (interview #8, 2016). All interviewees, whether or not they identified as Muslim, believed that being “Muslim” or “looking like a Muslim” had become a stigma in Europe equated with outsiders, terrorists, and invaders. As a result, many feel both threatened and trapped in asylum camps. As Witteborn argues, for some migrants “mobility is restricted by international and national laws as well as socio-political discourses, which regulate the migrant body and her ability to create social relations asylum seekers are spatially constructed and arrested through bureaucratic labelling and assignment to heterotopias and as a discursive location of transience and difference” (2011, p. 1142).

#### 5.3.4. Physical and sexual violence

Reports of physical and sexual violence were lowest in host states. Some of the physical violence experienced by migrants within EU borders occurred while in transit at the hands of its police or locals, who are often influenced by sensational or biased media reports and racist national narratives built on exclusivity. Three interviewees reported experiencing or witnessing physical violence by guards or other asylum seekers, often along racial or religious lines, signifying perceptions of historical mistreatment and hierarchical racism that can exist among some Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans.

Likewise, some reported sexual violence occurred in EU countries outside of the states where interviews were conducted, or occurred during clandestine transit within the host state. While decreasing physical and sexual violence could be a result of numerous factors (including under-reporting for fear of retribution while awaiting asylum, or the relatively short journeys in the host state compared to earlier legs), it also may reflect the influence of modern surveillance and increased vigilance with abundant security cameras and ID scanners installed throughout the camps. In addition, the social contract within the host states and enforcement of general “expectations” of public behavior may foster an environment of social surveillance and intolerance to these forms of violence in public view.

## 6. Conclusion

This paper presents a typology developed from data collected in an examination of the production of various forms of violence (physical, verbal, psychological, sexual, and non-linear) across three state spaces (source, transitional, and host) during an irregular migration to the EU. All migrants who reached EU asylum camps in this project experienced myriad forms of violence across space. The typology underpins state responsibility for various forms of violence that migrants experience. All interviewees attested that the violence began in their source state and was the primary impetus for emigration. However, while violence within a failed state or a warzone was pervasive, they also experienced violence throughout clandestine journeys and camp life. As Nevins (2010, 2017) argues, many states consider territorial sovereignty their right and generate spatial regimes that exclude and inflict violence against migrants.

Migrants experience a kaleidoscope of violence across time and space, which changes with their anticipated or actual presence. This typology serves as an analytical tool to better understand how and why certain forms of violence against migrants occur in certain spaces. It can be employed to formulate research questions and design studies that focus on how geopolitical spaces and types of violence interact, how violence transforms over space, and how geopolitical spaces shape the

forms of violence present within.

Organizing research by different geopolitical settings and forms of violence reveals the interconnections underpinning networks of spatial governance and violent acts against migrants. For example, research may focus on how the prevalence of non-linear, psychological and verbal violence in host states surpasses physical or sexual. Conversely, one may interrogate how non-linear violence materializes and functions differently across space. Thus, this guide can both facilitate analysis and theory-building on irregular migration and spaces of violence, and foster collaborative integration of disparate research. By tracing the political geography of violence against migrants, this typology highlights the role of state production of violence and erosion of migrants’ human rights. The ability to identify spaces and source(s) of violence strengthens efforts to advocate for changes in policy and political narratives about irregular migrants as well as civilians in failed or war-torn states. This typology also promotes future avenues of research into state efforts to spatially legislate and control mobility, reassert sovereignty, and expand territorial power through detention and containment.

However, because this investigation is based on case studies, further research is necessary. A more complete synthesis of the sources and the spatial aspects of various forms of violence against migrants will facilitate more effective translation of findings and discussions with policy makers and the media. In this way, scholarly research can play a greater role in efforts to confront legislation, practices and narratives that produce violence against migrants in their source, transitional and host states. Violence in war-torn or failed states, which cannot execute basic requirements such as governance, security and education, is a product of disrupted political environments that fuel terrorism, state violence, and deficiencies that motivate the public to support or engage in violence. Neighboring states can exacerbate these internal conflicts by intentionally or inadvertently further destabilizing the state and elevating violence. Civilians are extremely vulnerable to all five forms of violence in a subverted political environment, as state institutions, governance, and civilians’ livelihoods and safeguards erode.

Migrants’ right to claim asylum is increasingly corroded by states’ exclusionary geopolitical articulations of belonging and space, divulged through governance, state immigration policies, and the escalation of policing and hardening of state borders. Thus “unwanted” migrants are forced to travel outside of legal migratory procedures and exploit irregular methods, often along smuggler networks, which exposes migrants to all five forms of violence. The EU’s transnational bordering processes extend beyond physical borders. They are increasingly militarized through heightened policing and technology that emphasizes physical deterrence and the racialized recasting of migrants as threats to national security. This also obscures the externalized production of violence as states assert themselves by pushing migrant detention and processing beyond their borders.

However, this increasing externalization of asylum responsibilities coupled with a hardening of policy towards migrants contributes to forms of geopolitical violence that migrants experience not only as they travel, but in daily life in asylum camps. Migrants become the discernible embodiment of violence generated through exclusionary rhetoric and labeling, migration policies, and asylum laws that limit mobility and basic rights. During their protracted wait in asylum camps, migrants experience abandonment and hate speech, feelings of hopelessness, and serious health problems.

The typology presented here has significant implications for future research. It serves as a meta-guide, offering scholars a foundation to encourage cross-evaluation and collaboration among various situated case-studies and methodologies on violence against migrants. Political geography, alongside critical migration and border studies, is perfectly positioned to interrogate and address the intersecting mechanisms, actors, and practices that produce various forms of violence. This includes those intrinsic in efforts to securitize migration and harden asylum policies in states such as the United States, the EU, and Australia. In this way, scholars can continue to work to expose, advocate change, and

rectify the hierarchical imbalances of power and responsible actors of such violence.

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## Appendix A. Supplementary data

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