Migrant Agency and Counter-Hegemonic Efforts Among Asylum Seekers in the Netherlands in Response to Geopolitical Control and Exclusion

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ABSTRACT

Migrants who reach EU asylum camps face various forms of spatialised violence that are bolstered by or produced within these geopolitical protracted spaces of waiting. Segregated from society, migrants experience processes of displacement, alienation and vulnerability as their legal status restricts their mobility and postpones employment or education opportunities. They are simultaneously suspended in a state of continuous disruption as they move through a series of camps while waiting for a decision on their applications. In remonstration, some migrants develop advocacy networks within and across camps in an attempt to challenge the hierarchical control of the everyday spaces and politics that migrants encounter in camps. Drawing on original fieldwork, this paper interrogates the intersection of the spatial production of geopolitical violence in camps and migrant agency within these distinctive political spaces. I argue that a state-centred examination of spaces of violence and migrant agency fails to attend to embodied and emotional landscapes when problematising the geographies of camps and those waiting in interim zones of confinement. In contrast, this examination of the embodied migrant experiences and advocacy networks brings the geopolitics of human and affective matter to the forefront. In this way, the article highlights migrant agency in response to their lived experience and the embodied geopolitical violence of control, categorisation and exclusion that is produced in the various spatialities of asylum seeking.

Introduction

Life in this asylum camp is full of constant change and the unknown. It’s a life under surveillance and full of wasted time. Since conditions here are not good, we have come together to advocate for improvements in the camp and more control over our lives while we wait (personal interview #8, spokesperson for Asylum Seekers Alliance of Keipelgevangenis Camp, 2016).

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An unpresented number of asylum seekers arrived in the Netherlands beginning in 2014 as part of a larger migration into Europe. Many experienced various forms of spatialised control and geopolitical violence produced by migration legislation (e.g., Casas-Cortes 2015; Dempsey 2018, 2020; Jones and Johnson 2016; Mitchell 2006; Mountz 2011). Throughout the application process, migrants reside in asylum camps that are often segregated from society. The camps are in effect geopolitical and temporal spaces of state control and generate forms of geopolitical violence via processes of exclusion, displacement, alienation and vulnerability for migrants. The quotation above from a Syrian asylum seeker and advocacy organiser illuminates the precarious conditions in which migrants remain trapped for an extended time. Bureaucratic processes pertaining to asylum applications in the Netherlands take extended periods of time, during which many migrants feel confused, fearful and forgotten as they spend months or years waiting for a decision on asylum – what many consider a form of abandonment by the Dutch state. Their political subjectivities and precarious, liminal legal statuses are shaped by state regulations, labelling and coding, mobility restrictions and bordering practices predicated on exclusionary Westphalian categorisations of citizenship (e.g., Tazzioli 2020; Agamben 1998; Hyndman 2004, 2012; Hyndman and Giles 2011). Simultaneously, most are also forced to move through a series of camps while waiting for decisions on their applications in a ‘protracted state of purgatory’ (UNHCR 2006) and continuous disruption or dislocation (Rekenhamer 2018).

Perceptions of individuals living in asylum camps are often framed through exclusionary rhetoric that homogenises and categorises asylum seekers as passive and helpless, geopolitical and welfare threats, a non-citizen ‘Other,’ or framed asylum seekers as objectified victims (e.g., Cresswell 2006; Dempsey and McDowell 2019; Myadar 2021; Vayrynen 2017). Media reports and research on asylum seekers or refugees residing in European camps often present simplistic representations of places of sovereignty, power and victimisation, and examples of migrant agency remain understudied (e.g., Brun and Fabos 2015; Eastmond 2007; Ehrkamp 2017).

Contrary to this narrow view of migrant experiences, this article demonstrates how migrants routinely counter the state of surveillance, control and exclusion. This project draws from archival and original fieldwork conducted with asylum seekers in Dutch asylum camps, as well as those outside the asylum system who are designated as ‘undeportables.’ As many interviewees suggest, migrants actively challenge their situation and geopolitical subjectivities via resistance and agency, often through the production of grassroot networks that transcend the physical borders of the camps.

Indeed, asylum seekers display numerous and innovative methods of advocacy networks and agency within, across and beyond the borders of asylum camps in an attempt to challenge their experiences. In this regard, the asylum
camps can also be regarded as sites of generative struggles where alternative agencies are produced; and, despite various forms of control and subjectivity. The following work focuses on asylum seekers in the Netherlands since 2015 when the state witnessed a notable increase in the number of migrants (Figure 1: GIS maps of asylum applications over time). This article also highlights how camps can become the intersection of key forms of geopolitical control of asylum seekers (e.g., surveillance, segregation and exclusion), with that of migrant agency and networks forged within and beyond asylum camps to challenge these conditions.

This is also true for those who are politically remade by a state’s rejection of their asylum claims, such as an ‘undeportables’. These individuals, commonly called ‘illegals’ in the Netherlands, are often stateless individuals or persons who do not possess official documents (e.g., passports or other adequate documentation) to establish their nationality or country of origin. Without the necessary documentation, the Dutch state cannot identify where each individual needs to be ‘returned’ and, therefore, cannot deport these individuals. These bureaucratic expectations reveal a Westphalian perception of

Figure 1. Largest applicant states’ rapid increase in asylum applications to the Netherlands (2013–2015).
citizenship, which fails to recognise that some individuals do not possess birth certificates or passports. Indeed, Netherlands’ ‘undeportable’ migrants are individuals who are no longer permitted within asylum camps, mandated to leave the host state, but cannot legally be deported. Instead of disappearing into the shadows, many ‘underportables’ in the Netherlands have united to launch an international social media campaign to gain recognition for their struggle for asylum, challenging the categorisation of ‘rejected asylum seeker,’ and extending the advocacy networks that were established in the asylum camps beyond their physical boundaries.

This article thus examines often overlooked production of migrant agency networks in response to their lived experience of embodied geopolitical violence of control, categorisation and exclusion that is produced in the various spatialities of asylum seeking. To do so, the article relies on feminist geopolitics as a framework to understand how migrants counter their geopolitical subjectivities via agency (and corresponding networks) fostered within and extending beyond camp borders. Feminist geopolitics is useful in this investigation because it draws attention to the experiences of the disenfranchised across multiple geopolitical scales, including the body as the most intimate site (e.g., Hyndman 2019; Hiemstra 2019; Koopman 2011; Mountz and Hyndman 2006; Myadar and Davidson 2020c. In this way, it brings the geopolitics of human and affective matter to the forefront while highlighting migrant diversity, agency and strategic contestation of the asymmetry of power and policing (e.g.; Dowler and Sharp 2001; Hyndman 2004; 2019; Lee and Pratt 2012).

This article advances the understanding of feminist geographical engagement with respect to its empirical, epistemological and ontological intersections of migration, camps and power to interrogate forms of geopolitical control, marginalisation and the everyday life(s) of ‘dislocated temporality,’ (e.g., McNevin 2019; Shindo 2019) as well as migrant agency, both within and beyond camp borders. Feminist geopolitics argues that a state-centred approach of spaces of violence in camps fails to attend to embodied and emotional landscapes of asylum seekers (e.g., Katz 2001).

Examples of migrant agency are often embedded in diverse advocacy networks, social media campaigns, self-promotion and grassroots non-violent securities (e.g., Lee and Pratt 2012; Koopman 2011). This is an important avenue for problematising the effects of segregation and ostracisation of asylum seekers who are trapped in interim zones of confinement. Indeed, by examining embodied migrant experiences and advocacy networks that exist both in and outside of camps, this paper frames Dutch asylum camps not only as sites of control and violence but also as places in which migrants produce alternative agencies and advocacy networks that transcend camp borders and challenge subjectivity through Dutch asylum procedures.

The following discussion is organised in four main sections. The first section highlights theoretical discussions of state control of asylum seekers,
as well as migrant agency and counter-hegemonic efforts in and beyond camp boundaries. The second describes the methodology utilised for data collection and analysis. The third section, which draws on interview data, investigates examples of Dutch geopolitical control of migrants and migrant efforts to resist and counteract subjectivity by the state. The fourth section reflects on the data presented in the article and offers suggestions for subsequent research.

**Geopolitical Control and Migrant Agency in and beyond the Borders of Asylum Camps**

EU member-states employ an array of spatial strategies to control migrants and international irregular migration including militarisation and privatisation of migration control, offshore processing and detention centres and increased surveillance in asylum camps where migrants often wait in inhospitable and impermanent living conditions (e.g., Gill, Conlon, and Oeppen 2014; Jones and Johnson 2016; Mountz 2011). As a result, migrants experience a variety of forms of geopolitical control as well as pervasive and varied forms of violence throughout migration and asylum processes (e.g., Dempsey 2020; McConnell et al., 2017; Jones 2016). I contend that by focusing on the lived experience of migrants under Dutch geopolitical control, and how camps can become sites of struggle where migrant advocacy is produced, we can better understand how individuals are influenced by and respond to migration policies (e.g., Dowler and Sharp 2001; Hiemstra 2012, 2019; Mountz 2004; Hyndman 2004; Silvey 2005). For example, asylum seekers’ restricted mobility within a host state is highly political (e.g., Ashutosh 2012; McNevin 2019; Tazzioli 2020; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010). Their transitory legal status under immigration law regulates their movement and ‘spatial positioning,’ underpinned by states’ political constructions of space ‘Otherness’ (Gupta and Ferguson 1992). Indeed, the spatial violence of these restrictions imposed on migrant bodies ‘arrest’ their movement within national borders and in camps where geopolitical hierarchical orderings are grounded in everyday life.

As migrant experiences within and ‘in connection to’ camps, which are distinct political and spatio-temporal spaces, academic investigations must ‘engage the conditions of encampment or capture and the multiple practices through which refugees and asylum seekers escape or contest these techniques of policing and provisioning’ (Opondo and Rinelli 2015, 932). In this way, scholarly investigations are more effectively able to highlight avenues of migrant agency, advocacy and resistance within and beyond camp borders. The avenues for migrant agency occur at the scale of an individual body (e.g., hunger strikes and lip sewing), within camps via advocacy groups and trans-camp and post-camp advocacy networks and social media campaigns that can occur in the camps as well as extend beyond physical camp borders (e.g., Bargu 2017).
There is a growing body of recent work that illuminates experiences of asylum seekers and refugees in the ‘spatialities of the camp’ (e.g., Davies and Isakjee 2015; Gilroy 2013; Katz 2016; Katz 2017; Minca 2015; Martin 2015; Maestri 2017; Ramadan 2013) and, more specifically, camps in Europe (e.g., Cuttitta 2012; Darling 2011; Rygiel 2011). Instead of homogeneous conceptualisations of camp space (conditions and structures vary greatly), scholarly attention focuses on particular geopolitical contexts, migrant diversity and mobilities, and migrant provisional legality (e.g., Casas-Cortes, et al. 2015; Feldman 2015; Hyndman 2012; Wilson 2014). The embodied geopolitical experiences that migrants encounter in camps are often contingent on ‘nationality, social class, ‘racial profile,’ gender, their overall embeddedness within territorial political institutions and their place of residence’ (Minca 2015, 80). However, examinations of camps as sites of migrant agency and advocacy networks remain understudied. This article aims to fill this gap.

Feminist geopolitics is well positioned to highlight migrant agency by looking beyond focusing solely on statecraft, thereby fostering the examination of individuals and agencies (e.g., Hakli and Kallio 2014; Koopman 2011). While anti-geopolitics, a branch within critical geopolitics, rejects elite practice(s) and focuses on ‘geopolitics from below,’ the resistance to political policies and institutions, representations and the media (Routledge 2003), feminist geopolitics re-envisions this resistance to emphasise who, how, what and at which scales (Dowler and Sharp 2001; Shindo 2019; Vayrynen, Pehkonen, and Vaittinen 2017). By highlighting the embodied experiences and practices of the disenfranchised, these individuals and their voices are made more discernible. Bodies, such as those of migrants, become the ‘sites of performance in their own right’ (Dowler and Sharp 2001, 169) as they work to overcome processes of control and marginalisation. For example, Hyndman (2007) encouraged feminist geopolitics to employ ‘finer and coarser’ examinations to reveal spaces of violence, safety of individuals and groups and mobility as a lens for spatial manifestations of geopolitical power. Thus, as individuals and groups who come together to advocate for change, work to challenge the spatial, material and embodied violence of state domination.

**Methodology**

This project draws from archival and original fieldwork conducted with asylum seekers between May and August of 2016 and 2017 in 15 Dutch asylum camps (39 1–3-h, semi-structured ethnographic interviews) and with seven ‘undeportables’ forced outside the asylum system. The research also included participant observations and interviews with camp ambassadors, local social workers, and Red Cross employees but focuses primarily on the ethnographic interviews with asylum seekers and ‘undeportables’ in the Netherlands. I conducted fieldwork in accordance with the Human
Subjects Protocol set by the Institutional Review Board for this project. Interview participants were recruited through networks via: camp ambassadors, the Red Cross, local social workers and the author in the field. Interviews occurred in private rooms in camps or at the local Red Cross facilities, based on interviewees’ preferences. All interviews were conducted in the interviewee’s language of choice and facilitated with a translator when necessary. I interviewed a diverse group of individuals from different countries of origin, age, class, family status, genders and religious/spiritual backgrounds. Each interview focused on lived experiences on campus and any efforts made by interviewees to counteract state control/legislation while seeking asylum in the Netherlands. All were catalogued anonymously and transcribed for analysis. In order to unsettle the hierarchical power imbalances and relational positionalities of interviewing, these interviews were conducted utilising reciprocal interviewing (e.g., Dempsey 2018) through which participants were encouraged to ask about the interviewer’s personal life.

**Examples of Geopolitical Control and Exclusion of Asylum Seekers in the Netherlands**

This section demonstrates how asylum camps become spaces of governmentality, surveillance, control, exclusion and embodied geopolitical violence for asylum seekers. This section also lays the groundwork for the following discussion of how migrants respond via counter-hegemonic efforts and/or resistance to their legal subjection by the state.

According to interviewees, asylum seekers experience geopolitical control in and beyond camps – institutionalised sites of corporal control – in multitude of ways, including technological forms of control, surveillance, categorisation, exclusion and segregation from city centres and local residents. For example, asylum seekers in the Netherlands are subjected to fingerprinting and a registration cycle in order to begin the asylum process (Rekenkamer 2018). A coalition of Dutch Border Police (KMar) and Alien Police (AVIM) are responsible for the initial process of identifying and registering migrants. Should international background checks reveal that a migrant possesses citizenship from a state that is geopolitically categorised as ‘safe’ (regardless of their individual situation within it), prior registration in another EU member-state (i.e., Dublin III Regulation 2013), or ‘other questionable criteria’ (www.gov.nl.immigration), the application is rejected and the individual is physically removed from the camp. Immigration regulations state that migrants from ‘safe’ countries will be rejected based upon pre-existing geopolitical relations. In these circumstances, it is extremely rare in the Netherlands for an asylum seeker’s appeal to successfully overturn the initial rejection of their application (Rekenkamer 2018).
The variety of categorisations of temporary legal status for migrants in Europe has also proliferated greatly (e.g., Levy 2010). There are also categorial biases against certain individuals based on intrastate geopolitics. For example, while Syrian asylum seekers were identified as ‘non-economic’ migrants as a blanket category, those from Afghanistan or Eritrea were commonly labelled as ‘economic’ migrants thus experienced higher rates of rejection of asylum (UNHCR 2019). As one interviewee from Afghanistan explained:

My chances of gaining asylum would be much better for me if I was from Syria. The Dutch system treats Syrians better; they get separate application procedures and are granted asylum more often and faster than Afghans or Iraqis. I know some Afghans lose their ID papers and try say they are from Syria. Better treatment, better chances of asylum if they believe you (interview #22, 2016).

In the Netherlands, when individuals’ applications are rejected, they are contacted by the Dutch Repatriation and Departure International Service (DT&T) and are subsequently deported. For those who were not initially rejected by KMar or AVIM, the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) interviews the remaining asylum seekers to determine if their asylum claim is ‘valid.’ During this time, the applicants commonly face a protracted period of waiting for a decision on their application in camps where they are under a multitude of layered surveillance.

Dutch asylum camps are collectively administered by the Dutch Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA). The COA governs all asylum camps, including providing sustenance, accommodation and medical care for the inhabitants – the quality of which has been questioned by many asylum seekers. The numerous forms of surveillance and control that asylum seekers are subjected to range from security cameras, digital tracking and weekly fingerprint checks in the camp’s main office. This technologically driven biometric system provides greater legal and spatial control as it expunges migrants’ individualities and reduces them to a single immigration ID number. Some of the camps’ gates are opened with a resident migrant’s fingerprint scan (personal interview #8, 2016), turning migrant bodies into state-registered biometric keys (e.g., Koshravi 2010). Additionally, if an individual does not complete a weekly fingerprint scan, they become ineligible to receive 1 week of benefits, including food stipends. These and other surveillance and monitoring tactics are just a few examples of methods that are used to control migrants.

The vast consequences of these and other dehumanising governance procedures that have materialised through technology can lead to an efficient removal or suspension of migrants’ basic human rights and protections (e.g., Gill, Conlon, and Oeppen 2014). If the camp system requires an individual to relocate to a different camp throughout the Netherlands, migrants have no recourse against the transfer. As a result, some asylum seekers lived in 2–4
different Dutch camps during their waiting processes. According to all interviewees, such forced dispersals are confusing and frightening. As the spokesperson for the Asylum Seekers Alliance of Keipelgevangenis Camp argued:

We believe these requirements and common policies are inhumane. We are scanned and IDed as if we are criminals or even farm animals. We have broken no laws by filing for asylum here, yet the government treats us like prisoners and denies us any form of human dignity while we wait for a decision on asylum’ (personal interview #8, 2016.)

Migrants’ mobility is a technique of state governance and control, which can be employed via detention, containment and/or dispersal throughout a host country. According to Tazzioli, this not only includes the frequent transfer of migrants through a series of camps but also by locating camps far from urban centres. Indeed, asylum seekers in the Netherlands are often geographically segregated from the general public due to the isolated locations of many asylum camps. Located in rural communities or on the outskirts of city centres, asylum seekers are forced to reside apart from the larger community and, often, at great distances from grocery markets or supply stores (e.g., Dempsey 2018). Thus, in this way, these camps set migrants apart in sites of exclusion, difference, temporality and stasis as they wait in legal limbo.

Indeed, many are forced to reside in temporary or makeshift constructions that range from tents, shipping containers and obsolete former prisons (COA 2017). The conditions reflect a sudden increase in asylum seekers in the Netherlands as well as the state’s intentional efforts to appear less attractive as an asylum destination than Germany or Sweden (Tesfamariam 2017). Diverse populations of migrants (e.g., nationality, linguistic, cultural, religious, gender/sexual orientation, or age) are forced into these sites of capture – small and crowded rooms that afford no space for privacy, religious practices, or food preparation. This includes religiously adherent migrants’ ability to gather communally to pray as COA regulations prohibit ‘religious gatherings’ in the camps (Tesfamariam 2017). As one interviewee pointed out, ‘there are no common rooms where we are allowed to gather to pray in a group or in private’ (interview #11, 2016). According to Tazzioli, these are tactics employed to prevent migrants from feeling ‘settled’ in place (2020, 11). As one male Afghan interviewee explained, he was assigned to a container camp in north-central Netherlands. He sleeps in a small and crowded room with three bunk beds full of men from different countries, religious and linguistic backgrounds:

The room is always noisy and crowded. There is no space to sit or move around and we are always in each other’s way. We do not all speak the same language, so it is hard to communicate, it is hard to sleep and hard to pray. Also, some hate the others in the room because of country of origin. The room is not a good place (interview #19, 2016).
As asylum seekers experienceprotracted waiting times for a decision on their applications (averaging between 9 months to 2 years, but many wait up to 4 years), their limited legal status within a host state restricts their mobility, privacy and many of their basic rights in what some have identified as a 'violent abandonment' by the state (e.g., Davies and Isakjee, 2003; Opondo and Rinelli 2015, 932). Indeed, all interviewees expressed regret, and in some cases resentment, for the time lost and potential opportunities as they waited for a decision on asylum. As one interviewee from Syria explained:

Before the war, I was an engineer. I was productive. But now I wait and do nothing all day– they will not let me work and I cannot travel to Germany - nothing until they decide on my application. I called the Asylum Office to ask how much longer. They told me to wait more, there are many applications. I fear they will forget me (personal interview #31, 2016.)

The stress of the living conditions, traumatic experiences during/after their journey to Europe and the bureaucratic uncertainty of their asylum status contributes to many migrants’ poor health (e.g., Dempsey 2020; Maillet, Mountz, and Williams 2016). There has been a high rate of suicides in the asylum camps, including 13 deaths and 80 attempts in the first half of 2014 alone (COA 2015). The imposed constraints are grounded in protracted liminalities and disruption, including the fact that most migrants are moved through many different camps before receiving a decision on their applications, which further increases migrant vulnerability within the state.

The geopolitical forces that produce and assign categorical labels to each migrant (e.g., refugee, asylum seeker, illegal immigrant, (un)deportable) present another form of violence inscribed on migrant bodies. Asylum seekers and refugees are constructed (i.e., made) and arrested through categorical labels that mark them as different. They are classified and discriminated as a migrant ‘Other,’ in essence constructing migrant bodies as discursive locations that are ‘out of place’ and transient within state sovereign borders (e.g., Gabrielatos and Baker 2008). These legal categorisations are also significant as they are utilised to distinguish host states’ power and responsibility for each migrant (Maillet, Mountz, and Williams 2016). In addition, certain categorical labels deny or grant ‘access to physical and social spaces (e.g., travelling within a country or between countries and being allowed to work) and resources’ (Witteborn 2011, 1146). For example, Dutch laws do not permit asylum seekers to work or pursue specialised/higher education during this time, thereby producing individuals that are financially dependent on the host state.

In 2015, the Dutch government created a five-tiered multi-track policy to enable authorities to ‘work more efficiently to turn down asylum applications from aliens abusing the asylum procedure’ (Ministry of Security and Justice
and Dutch immigration laws also divide migrants between the following major geopolitical categories:

An ‘alien’ is an individual that lacks Dutch citizenship (recognizing that not all have arrived to seek asylum); an ‘asylum seeker’ is an alien who applies for asylum; a ‘deportable’ is an alien with a rejected asylum application is order to leave (the term ‘illegal’ is applied if they refuse to leave); ‘undeportable’ is an alien whose asylum application is rejected, but cannot legally be deported; while ‘refugee’ is reserved for individuals who gain official status are permitted to remain within the Netherlands (Rekenhamer 2018, 12).

These categorical labels also cultivate an environment of exclusionary rhetoric and stereotypes, often based on primordial perceptions of differences within the public and the media. The European media has been instrumental in discursively invoking, producing and perpetuating geopolitical articulations of differences that liken migrant presence within European borders to an invasion (e.g., Dempsey and McDowell 2018). Under-age migrants are required to attend public schools, but they are labelled as ‘aliens’ [allochtonen] that often reaffirms and reinforces divisions between them and the rest of the student body. Many migrant interviewees reported experiencing forms of racial discrimination and targeted hate speech, such as ‘terrorists’, ‘welfare thieves’, ‘filth’ by some of the members of the public, police and other government officials in the Netherlands (e.g., interviews #9, 2016 and #33, 2017).

These and similar exchanges have caused many migrants to feel threatened and trapped as they await a decision on their asylum papers. Indeed, as Witteborn argues, ‘For some migrants, however, mobility is restricted by international and national laws as well as socio-political discourses, which regulate the migrant body and her ability to create social relations asylum seekers are spatially constructed and arrested through bureaucratic labelling and assignment to heterotopias and as a discursive location of transience and difference’ (2011, 1142). In this way, migrant bodies are rendered as transient places of exceptionalism and exclusion within a host country.

In the politics of space and ‘Otherness,’ migrants are commonly ‘stripped of their identities as individuals and re-subjectified as groups’ (Mountz 2011, 386) along national and racial lines. The biases that underpin European categorisation of migrants also reflect significant racial and national discrimination. Particularly since 2015, Syrian migrants have been prioritised, ‘fast tracked,’ and in some cases provided separate accommodations and processing centres than the rest of irregular migrants entering Europe. Indeed, despite a variety of distinct conclusions, examinations of such geographies of exclusion reveal that many of these rulings are underpinned by racial and/or geopolitical prejudices (e.g., rejection of many Afghani, Iranian and Somali applications while ‘fast-tracking’ Syrians5). This hierarchical preference and priority treatment produce
great resentment and tensions among some asylum seekers (e.g., personal interview #2, 6, 8, 11, 2016) and have also been condemned by the UN in recent reports (UNHCR 2016). In essence, migrants continue to be bound by the borders of their state of origin, for some producing a ‘stigma’ that can significantly influence their treatment within a host state as well as their chances of gaining asylum.

The state also functions as a ‘gatekeeper’ that determines which migrants are ‘worthy’ of asylum and which should be forcibly removed from its sovereign borders through decisions underpinned by racial and sexual discrimination. For example, the Dutch state and courts have ruled against asylum applications from individuals from Iraq unless the applicant is a homosexual, which is a crime in Iraq. Applicants who list sexual orientation as the impetus for their forced migration are subject to a particularly invasive line of questioning that can include questions such as: ‘How long have you known that you were gay? Describe in detail how you knew that you were gay and how you have acted as a result. Have you ever had doubts about being gay? What have you done to accept yourself as gay? How has your sexual orientation affected your family?’ However, in 2017, the Dutch IND rejected an application on the basis that the applicant ‘was not gay enough’ to merit asylum despite protests from the LGBT Asylum Support Organization in Amsterdam (Rainey 2017).

Migrant Agency and Counter-hegemonic Efforts in and beyond Camp Borders

While many assumptions pertaining to asylum seekers are often framed by passivity and helplessness (e.g., Malkki 1995), feminist geopolitics works to highlight embodied agency and counter-hegemonic efforts. By highlighting some of the ‘lesser-known political struggles’ (McNevin 2019) and specific forms of migrant solidarity, feminist geopolitics sheds light on the many ways in which migrants resist state control, exclusion and the conditions of their lived experiences. During extended periods of legal limbo under the state, many migrants actively challenge and negotiate the everyday geopolitical life that they encounter both in and outside of asylum camps. For example, Brun and Fabos (2015) demonstrate ways in which migrants actively ‘make homes’ during protracted displacement. The multi-scalar variety of counter-hegemonic efforts also includes protests at the level of the individual body (e.g., see Gill, Conlon, and Oeppen 2014 regarding hunger strikes and lip sewing), organising advocacy groups within a particular camp, or demanding system-wide structural changes within Dutch migration legislation. Feminist geographers have also drawn attention to migrant material practices, such as destroying passports or expunging their fingerprints, as a form of counter-hegemonic agency as well (e.g., Mountz 2011; Gill, Conlon, and Oeppen 2014; Malkki 1995).
According to interviewees, asylum seekers are becoming increasingly proactive in their resistance to state control and many of the bureaucratic processes they believe are unjust. Often facilitated through social media, several prominent migrant advocacy networks are forging new political spaces and offering new organising strategies for advocating for change. Some of their actions have resulted in modifications of Dutch immigration policies. One of the earliest successful campaigns focused on access to education. Previously, adult migrants were banned from participating in any form of employment or educational study in the Netherlands until/unless their asylum applications were approved. Recognising the importance of possessing the ability to understand and speak Dutch during the asylum application process, migrants of various nationalities and creeds organised protests to demand access to Dutch language classes in asylum camps before receiving a decision on their asylum application (e.g., personal interview #5, 8, 12, & 34, 2016, 2017). After significant campaigning (in person and social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter), and supplemental pressure from local NGOs and supportive government agencies (e.g., Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Tegeringsbeleid), adult asylum seekers gained the right to study Dutch in camps (e.g., personal interview #8, 2016).

The significance of this accomplishment should not be overlooked. As one of the social workers that supported this campaign stated, ‘gaining local language knowledge empowers and strengthens migrants’ ability to self-advocate, make more-informed decisions, and establish and facilitate support networks across a variety of migrant nationalities’ (personal interview #22, 2016). While this is a challenging undertaking, particularly due to the variety of linguistic and educational diversity present among asylum seekers (Van Heelsum 2017), many of their self-organised advocacy groups also work to ameliorate these gaps through in-camp tutoring and provide donated and/or publicly available technology (e.g., low-cost smartphones or access to public/library computers) to those who do not possess their own (e.g., personal interview #2, 2016).

Other organising strategies include those who actively work together to document and share their experiences through print, social media and/or scholarly publications to garner attention, raise awareness and advocate for legislative change. For example, because the Dutch Koepelgevangenis asylum camp is housed in a former prison, many of its inhabitants organised an advocacy group to argue that their bleak accommodations were both inhumane and reinforced xenophobic beliefs that ‘migrants are criminals’ and that seeking asylum was a criminal activity. This organisation also began working with local social workers and lawyers to campaign for better treatment, transportation to the city centre, improved housing accommodations (physical structures and personal privacy), racial/ethnic equality among asylum applications and access to education while awaiting asylum decisions. They
contacted the municipal mayor and invited him to tour the camp facilities to witness their living conditions. Among the many suggestions, they asked the mayor to consider the removal of weekly fingerprint scans, suggesting that it frames asylum seekers as prisoners, unnecessarily subjugating migrants and reinforcing the perception that asylum seeking is a crime.

Over time, their actions raised awareness among the local community and subsequently gained some support for their campaign. As the leader of this advocacy group explained:

We have seen an increase of local community members volunteering here. They come and offer free language classes and ‘language tables’ to help migrants learn and practice Dutch. Others come to assist with legal paperwork, advocate for sponsorship by a local business (who might pay for private accommodations), and offer transportation and advise to their required immigration meetings during the asylum process. Recently, a ‘watch dog agency’ started tracking and documenting ethnicity in accepted asylum applications in order to publicize ethnic bias in the Dutch asylum system (personal interview #3, 2016).

In addition, the local government agreed to add a new bus stop at the entrance of the camp in order to increase migrant mobility and access to the city centre. Engineers were tasked with evaluating possibilities for structural and personal-privacy improvements within camps.

This and similar advocacy groups forge and maintain networks that originated within camps and now extend beyond camp boundaries, highlighting the importance of social advocacy and collective agency. For example, members contact former asylum seekers that gained asylum within the Netherlands to encourage them to return to the camps as volunteers, help others navigate the asylum process and/or serve as ‘witnesses’ in the camp to hold administrators accountable for camp living conditions. Others have become public speakers or met with lawmakers to advocate for legislative changes for asylum seekers and other irregular migrants in the Netherlands. As Lee and Pratt’s 2012 work demonstrated, similar examples of solidarity highlight the importance of social relations and networks in regard to how migrant agency is conceptualised, produced and employed.

Increasingly, asylum seekers have opted to widely publicise their protests. For example, some publicly protested their living conditions in the streets of major Dutch cities, such as Amsterdam, in hopes of gaining sympathy and support from their campaign. Many advocacy groups believe that utilising official bureaucratic channels and social/print media via technology is a more successful approach for reaching a larger audience (interview with the head of the Dutch Asylum Seekers Alliance, May 2017). Social media continues to offer migrants new avenues of communication in which they can receive and exchange information. They can also express their opinions and personal experiences to a global audience. Many utilise technology in their various avenues of resistance to facilitate navigating bureaucratic red tape,
communicate with other asylum-seekers, teach new arrivals in camps, as well
as publicise their stories and share information about their living conditions
within the camps in order to demand improvements and legislative changes.
Increasingly, the implemented improvements within a particular camp (e.g.,
Keipelegevangenis Camp) are shared as a precedent from which other camps
may utilise to advocate for similar improvements as well.

This technological knowledge also facilitates the creation of new migrant
advocacy groups. For example, as migrants increasingly share knowledge
about camp conditions, accommodations and experiences in person and via
social media and individuals utilise this data to lobby within their own camp
for improved facilities, treatment or accommodations. Others employ mobile
apps to identify safe places to shop and recreate [what] near their camps (e.g.,
visit-related asylum forums). As one interviewee explained, ‘I read Facebook
reports by other migrant groups to learn which market stores are safe for me to
shop. If there were any problems on the bus or in the city centre when they
were there. After I read, I go where I will not be bothered or harassed’
(personal interview #5, 2016).

While not all asylum seekers cooperate or even interact with one another in
the camps, it is notable that a number of individuals from diverse nationalities,
ethnicities, religions, genders and ages actively choose to collaborate over these
platforms despite these disparities. Particularly through the use of technology,
asylum camp advocacy groups and refugees have reached larger audiences,
maintained contact and continue to collaborate on national migrant advocacy
campaigns. McNevin (2019, 13) has also demonstrated how ‘transformational
solidarity’ can connect groups of individuals that are ‘too often pitted against
each in ways that obscure shared forms of oppression and the potential for
common political platforms.’

While the spatial violence imposed on asylum seekers regarding mobility
and surveillance within camps produces a space of state governance and social
exclusion from the general public primarily through isolation and ostracisa-
tion, the borders of these interim zones of confinement do not represent the
geographical limit of diverse forms of embodied violence experienced by
migrants within the Netherlands. Indeed, there are migrants who are excluded
or expelled from the physical boundaries of asylum camps. This is particularly
true for migrants who are administratively barred from their premises if their
asylum applications are rejected. In this way, asylum camps consequently
become spaces of greater exclusion that subject ‘rejected’ asylum seekers to
removal and often eventual deportation – ‘a secondary instrument of migra-
tion control’ (Gibney 2008, 147). However, the migrant networks and adv ocacy
practices fostered within camps extend beyond their borders, particularly
for ‘undeportables’ migrants. Indeed, there is a significant ‘deportation gap’
between those who are authorised for deportation and those who the state
actually removes. This includes individuals who cannot obtain residency

permits in the Netherlands (and cannot apply for asylum in a different EU member-state), but who cannot physically be returned to their country of origin – known as an ‘undeportable’.

The state marginalises ‘undeportables’ by barring them access to migrant reception centres or asylum camps. They are also commonly apprehended by the police, imprisoned or forced to live on the streets without state support. Subsequently, they are subjected to a cycle of arrests, detentions and ‘expulsion attempts’ only to eventually be returned to the streets. Indeed, in recent years, the Dutch government has increased the number of detentions of irregular migrants, but not the number of deported migrants (Rekenkamer 2018). The impact of this embodied geopolitical violence for many migrants has manifested in an increase in physical and mental health illnesses (e.g., Dempsey 2020). According to Amnesty International:

More than half of the country’s ‘undeportable’ irregular migrants and rejected asylum-seekers cannot be legally expelled and are often left destitute after having gone through the Dutch asylum procedure and detention system. Although the numbers are inevitably rough estimates, human rights organizations report that there are currently approximately 35,000 to 60,000 people living in the Netherlands illegally who de facto cannot be deported even when apprehended by immigration authorities . . . Having exhausted all judicial possibilities of remaining legal resident in the Netherlands, thousands of people, including families with children, are simply put on the street and told to leave the country within 48 hours (cited in Brechenmacher et al., 2016:2).

Yet, in spite of the systemic state-sanctioned violence these individuals experience, many ‘undeportables’ have self-organised with others from their former asylum camp(s) of similar geopolitical fate in resistance to Dutch policies of exclusion. Many begin organising before they are forced out of the camps or utilising social media to communicate and strategize, and many of these individuals chose to publicly protest their violent rejection by the state. Their practice of refusal demonstrates powerful critiques of Dutch citizenship and naturalisation regulations, and their strategy to publicly challenge the state’s current immigration legislation forges new spaces of politics that extend beyond granted citizenship or within the perimeter of an asylum camp.

Their first substantial protest, ‘Refugees-on-the-Street,’ began during the spring of 2011. These protestors established informal networks for support and information (e.g., Support Committee for Undocumented Workers OKIA), organised public campaign sit-ins in Amsterdam and the Hague, as well as street demonstrations with large banners with their slogan, ‘WE ARE HERE’. Their intentional employment of the term ‘refugee’ also exemplifies their counter-hegemonic claims within the Dutch asylum system. By self-identifying as ‘refugees,’ they are actively refuting the legitimacy of the Dutch state’s rejection of their asylum and humanitarian requests as they endeavour to gain support for their protest campaign.
By 2014, this group launched an international campaign under their slogan ‘WE ARE HERE’ (WIJ ZIJN HIER) and developed a Facebook and webpage to raise awareness of their transgressive struggles, shared situation(s), as well as the unique gendered experiences among the ‘undeportables.’ For example, while some churches, NGOs and migrant advocacy groups, such as Open Door (Wereldhuis), LOS (National Support for the Undocumented) or Vluchtelingenwerk are dedicated to helping these migrants, they cannot support all these individuals’ needs. They also stress the added elements of vulnerability for female and transgender ‘undeportables’ as many of the aforementioned support facilities have limited or no capacity to assist women and transgendered individuals. Subsequently, drug and sex traffickers have increasingly targeted these ‘undeportables’ in the Netherlands (Brechenmacher et al., 2016). Ultimately, their goal is to raise awareness of their geopolitical and physical vulnerabilities as well as advocate for legislative change in the Dutch asylum system. As their website proclaims:

We decided to make the inhumane situation that we have to live in – visible; by no longer hiding and illustrating what Dutch regulations and the ‘asylum gap,’ [not receiving aid, but cannot be deported] which is the root of our problems, are doing to refugees. Visit our website and Facebook for our press releases, reports and important announcement. You can also meet us in person.⁶

Through their social media and public campaigns, WE ARE HERE collectively work to challenge the accuracy and exclusionary enforcement practices of the Dutch asylum system, migrant categorical labels and the state’s ability to bypass what they believe are their basic human rights afforded by the 1951 Geneva Convention. They are also creating new connections among other migrants and others who share in solidarity. As one ‘undeportable’ in Amsterdam explained: ‘My human rights were violated by the Dutch military police and the State Secretary [Staatssecretaris] is aware of the violations and refused to do anything to help me. All I ask now is for basic shelter, but the Dutch government will not provide it to me. When I used social media, people heard and many have offered to help me’ (personal interview #39, 2017).

Through cooperation and collaboration, technology and local support, WE ARE HERE is working to re-map the geographies of exclusion in the Netherlands. They actively campaign for a right to asylum, to work and to forge places of belonging within a state that has declared them ‘placeless.’ Indeed, the aforementioned protest campaigns and advocacy networks are only some of the examples of the various forms of migrant agency present within and beyond camp borders as migrants actively negotiate and respond to the embodied violence and abandonment they experience at the hands of the Dutch state.
Conclusion

While increased mobility is a core tenet of a progressively globalising world, nevertheless, governance of human mobility is also a discriminatory and highly regulated mechanism in international geopolitics and political economy. This is particularly true for forced migrants whose movement and categorisation are highly political and restricted within a host state. Media discourses and xenophobic rhetoric inscribe and construct migrant bodies as alien, transient, threatening and marked as a site of difference. Asylum seekers are relegated to asylum camps where they remain under surveillance, scrutinised and forced to endure liminal temporality and extended wait times for the Dutch state’s decision on their application. The effects of this segregation and abandonment by the state are widespread and contribute to the production of camps as places of discursive and physical marginalisation and sites of spatial production of geopolitical control and exclusion.

Despite these conditions, many migrants actively challenge these experiences via resistance and agency, such as the production of grassroots advocacy networks that extend within and beyond the physical borders of the camps. This article advances conceptualisations of asylum camps beyond a simplistic perception of a site of power and control, but also a site of struggle where migrant advocacy networks are produced. In this way, camps can also be seen as distinct political spaces in which migrants’ sovereign subjugation is negotiated and challenged, counter-hegemonic acts are performed and where diverse migrant collaborative advocacy networks are forged, grounded and stretch beyond camp borders. Additionally, instead of presenting migrants as passive victims of the asylum system, the article has relied on feminist geographic frameworks to bring examples of human agency and affective matter within the geopolitics of asylum to the forefront.

This paper has highlighted examples of how migrants negotiate, resist and navigate the challenges of living in geopolitically situated subjectivity, both physically and digitally. Through their individual and networked advocacy groups, they subvert hegemonic geopolitical discourses and categorisations of migrants within the global geopolitical contexts of xenophobia that underpins the construction of political differences and irreconcilability. This includes the ‘undeportables’ many of whom continue to publicly advocate for their most basic human rights and challenge hierarchical constructions of illegality. Their actions provide examples of political agency and claims of belonging that exist outside of narrow legislation and categorisations of citizenship. Their struggles also underscore the asymmetry of power embedded in Dutch migration policy and state practices that regularly refute the humanitarian values and principles to which the Netherlands subscribes. As this paper is based on case studies, further research is required. Future research could engage the intersection(s)
of migrant agency and other states’ measures of migration control, particularly in response to COVID-19 quarantines and budgetary restructuring.

Despite inequities and human rights violations, many migrants remain undaunted as they publicly campaign for basic rights and actively contribute to their local communities through volunteer projects, such as urban renewal programmes and elder care (Wij Zijn Hier 2016). Such examples further highlight many asylum seekers’ bravery and strategic resistance to geopolitical subjectivity and control.

Notes

1. This interviewee was an asylum seeker in this camp and organised a grassroot alliance that advocates for better living conditions and access to education during the asylum process.
2. Other rulings include: rejected asylum seekers from failed states such as Syria, Ethiopia or Eritrea must be returned to their origin state voluntarily; states currently under a travel ban; citizens of former states such as Yugoslavia; or states that refuse to accept or assist in the return of its citizens (European Commission 2018).
3. The only exception was interview #8, who requested to be identified as the Spokesperson of the Camp Alliance.
4. These categorisations, appointed during the asylum application process, reflect the Dutch government’s claim that Afghanistan or Eritrea are "safe" countries of origin.
5. For annual asylum reports and registration procedures see European Commission 28 March, 2018.

References


WE ARE HERE (http://wijzijnhier.org/who-we-are/) accessed January 20, 2019